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The Covid-19 pandemic has brought about massive declines in wellbeing around the 
world. This paper seeks to quantify and compare two important components of those 
losses – increased mortality and higher poverty – using years of human life as a common 
metric. We estimate that almost 20 million life-years were lost to Covid-19 by December 
2020. Over the same period and by the most conservative definition, over 120 million 
additional years were spent in poverty because of the pandemic. The mortality burden, 
whether estimated in lives or in years of life lost, increases sharply with GDP per capita. 
The poverty burden, on the contrary, declines with per capita national incomes when a 
constant absolute poverty line is used, or is uncorrelated with national incomes when a 
more relative approach is taken to poverty lines. In both cases the poverty burden of the 
pandemic, relative to the mortality burden, is much higher for poor countries. The 
distribution of aggregate welfare losses – combining mortality and poverty and expressed 
in terms of life-years – depends both on the choice of poverty line(s) and on the relative 
weights placed on mortality and poverty. With a constant absolute poverty line and a 
relatively low welfare weight on mortality, poorer countries are found to bear a greater 
welfare loss from the pandemic. When poverty lines are set differently for poor, middle 
and high-income countries and/or a greater welfare weight is placed on mortality, upper-
middle and rich countries suffer the most.  
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Since its onset in December 2019, the Covid-19 pandemic has spread death and disease 
across the whole world. Around the time of its “first anniversary”, on 15 December 2020, 
1.64 million people were counted as having lost their lives to the virus globally2 and, 
because of the likelihood of under-reporting, that was almost certainly an undercount. 
Although it is primarily a health crisis – with substantial additional pain and suffering 
caused to the tens of millions who have survived severe cases of the disease and, in 
many cases, continue to suffer from long-term sequels – the pandemic has also had major 
economic effects. The current estimate is that global GDP per capita declined by 5.3% in 
2020. Economic contraction was widespread, with 172 out of the 182 countries for which 
data is available experiencing negative growth in real GDP per capita in 2020 (World 
Bank, 2021). 
 
This severe global economic shock has caused the first reversal in the declining trend in 
global extreme poverty (measured as the share of the world’s population living under 
$1.90 per day) since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 – and only the second real 
increase in world poverty since measurement began in the early 1980s.3 This increase in 
extreme deprivation comes with its own suffering and anguish: jobs and homes were lost 
and people struggled to feed their children and themselves. Many asked whether they 
“would die of Coronavirus or hunger?”.4 
 
This paper seeks to address two questions. First, what were the relative contributions of 
increased mortality and poverty to the welfare losses caused by the pandemic, and did 
these contributions vary systematically across countries? Second, how were the 
aggregate welfare losses distributed across countries? To do so, we revisit and update 
some of our earlier findings in Decerf et al. (2020, henceforth DFMS): that paper did not 
address the second question above and, conversely, we do not explore counterfactual 
herd immunity scenarios here, as we did there. The first question above was also 
addressed in the earlier article using mortality and poverty estimates from June 2020; 
which are updated here to December 2020.  
 
Our motivation is to look at the impact on the cross-country distribution of wellbeing with 
the recognition that both the health crisis and the economic debacle have caused huge 
welfare losses. We focus on extreme outcomes in both domains: mortality in the case of 
 
2 Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-covid-deaths-region. 
3 There was also an apparent increase in 1989, which is fully accounted for by China switching from an 
income to a consumption indicator. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY. 
4 On 11 February 2021 a Google search for “dying of coronavirus or hunger” yielded 2,330,000 results. 
Some of the titles on the first page included “The pandemic pushes hundreds of millions of people toward 
starvation and poverty” (Washington Post, 25 September 2020) and “More people may die from hunger 
than from the Coronavirus this year…” (Forbes, 9 July 2020).  




health and falling into poverty as the economic outcome. This implies that our estimates 
of welfare losses are clearly a lower-bound: we ignore the burden of the disease on those 
who survive it and, furthermore, data limitations mean that we look only at deaths officially 
classified as due to Covid, rather than the possibly preferable metric of excess deaths.5 
Similarly, we ignore welfare losses from income declines that do not entail entry into 
poverty and, furthermore, we look only at the short-term poverty consequences arising 
from the contemporaneous income losses in 2020. We ignore, therefore, the longer-term 
consequences of any insults to child development arising from additional undernutrition, 
or the likely substantial future consequences of the schooling crisis that resulted from the 
pandemic (see, e.g. Lustig et al, 2020). These choices are not intended to minimize the 
importance of those negative consequences of the pandemic. On the contrary, the 
evidence to date suggests that they will be extremely important. Rather, they follow from 
a desire to focus on the most severe short-term consequences of the crisis along the two 
principal dimensions of health and incomes, using the best available data while avoiding 
an accumulation of assumptions and simulations. We are forced to make some 
assumptions to fill data gaps that inevitably arise when analysing an ongoing 
phenomenon, but they are few and therefore are hopefully clearer and more transparent 
than if we had tried to incorporate expected future losses, and so on. 
 
A welfare-based approach requires comparing health and income losses or, in our case, 
mortality and poverty costs. As in DFMS, we eschew more traditional methods such as 
the valuation of statistical life (VSL, see e.g. Viscusi, 1993). Our approach is theoretically 
closer to the modeling of social welfare as aggregate expected lifetime utility, as in Becker 
et al. (2005) or Adler et al. (2020).  But, unlike those authors, we model the effect of the 
pandemic on social welfare in a way that allows us to use years of human life – either lost 
to premature mortality or spent in poverty – as our unit of comparison. This has two 
advantages over the alternative of using a money metric to value human lives: first, we 
hope it overcomes the instinctive aversion of many participants in the public debate to the 
idea of placing a “price” on human life. Second, the model yields a single, easily 
understandable normative parameter for the trade-off between mortality and poverty 
which has a direct, observable empirical counterpart. We can then simply present the 
empirical object for all countries in our sample, and let the reader compare her own 
valuation of the normative parameter to the data.  
 
The simple model is presented in DFMS, and we do not repeat it here. The basic 
ingredients are (i) a utilitarian welfare function that simply adds up lifetime individual utility 
across people and time periods;6 (ii) an individual utility function that depends solely on 
 
5 Even if data on excess mortality were more widely available it would also include additional deaths caused 
by poverty, potentially confounding our comparisons. 
6 With no aversion to inequality and no time discounting. 




whether one is dead, poor or non-poor;7 and (iii) an assumption that the pandemic may 
have two effects on people: it may (or may not) cause them to die earlier than they 
otherwise would, and it may (or may not) cause them to spend some additional years in 
poverty before dying, relative to the counterfactual. This simple framework yields the 
result that the overall welfare effect of the pandemic is proportional to a weighted sum of 
the number of years of life lost to premature (Covid-induced) mortality and the number of 





= 𝛼𝐿𝑌 + 𝑃𝑌 (1) 
 
where ∆𝑊 denotes the expected impact of the pandemic on social welfare; ∆𝑢𝑝 is the 
difference in yearly individual utility between being poor and non-poor; and LY and PY 
are respectively the total number of years of life lost and the total number of additional 
years spent in poverty due to the pandemic. α is a normative parameter that represents 
the ratio of the individual utility loss from each year lost to premature mortality (∆𝑢𝑑) to 
the loss from each additional year spent in poverty (∆𝑢𝑝).  α is therefore the (social) 
marginal rate of substitution between life- and poverty-years. It can be understood as the 
“shadow price” of a lost life-year, expressed in terms of poverty years. We think of it as a 
societal parameter, and therefore as some aggregation across individuals of the answer 
they might give to the following hypothetical question: “If you could make this bargain, 
how many years would you be willing to spend in poverty during the rest of your life in 
order to add one additional year at the end of your life?” 
 
Clearly, there is plenty of room for individual disagreement about the value of α. Different 
people might answer that question very differently, depending on how far above the 
poverty line they are (or expect to be); on their expected residual life-expectancy and, of 
course, on their preferences. We thus choose to remain mostly agnostic about α. In what 
follows, we simply present values for LY and PY across as many countries as possible. 
When we discuss the relative contributions of mortality and poverty, we present ratios of 
PY to LY, which the reader can compare to her own preferred value for α in order to 
assess which source is responsible for the larger welfare loss. Next, when we seek to 
summarize the inter-country distribution of welfare losses, we suggest a plausible range 
for α: between five and twenty years. 
 
7 Simple restrictions imply that this is a step-function approximation to utility that is increasing and concave 
in incomes, but the coarseness we introduce means that people are insensitive to income gains or losses 
that do not entail a crossing of the poverty line. This simplification may be seen as the price we pay for 
converting to a life-year metric, but it is also consistent with our emphasis – discussed above – on the 
extreme outcomes of death and destitution (defined as falling into poverty). 




The rest of this short paper is organized as follows. The next section describes how we 
compute the numbers of years of life lost (LY) and additional poverty years (PY) for each 
country, given the available data, and presents the estimates for 145 countries. Building 
on those ingredients, Section 3 summarizes the evidence on the relative importance of 
poverty and mortality in lowering welfare around the world. It also investigates the global 
distribution of those losses under plausible values for the key normative parameter, both 
for a constant absolute poverty line and under a more relativist approach to poverty 
identification. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Estimating additional mortality and poverty with imperfect data 
The two key data sources for our mortality estimates are the UN Population Division 
database and the Global Burden of Disease Database (Dicker et al., 2018). Combining 
data from these two sources and using smoothing procedures described in the Appendix 
to DFMS, we obtain estimates for the number of people of age a living in country j, Naj, 
for 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 99. 8 Using these country-specific population pyramids, we can also construct 
estimates for age-specific residual life expectancies, 𝜆𝑎𝑗. If we observed age-specific 
Covid-induced mortality rates maj, for all countries in our sample, then our estimate of 
years of life lost due to the pandemic in each country would be given by the sum across 
all ages of the number of deaths from that age group (𝑁𝑎𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑗), times the average residual 
life-expectancy at that age:9 
 





The above procedure is exactly what DFMS used for six countries for which we had age-
specific Covid-related mortality data. As in that earlier paper, however, we do not observe 
Covid mortality data disaggregated by age for most countries in our global sample. In 
addition to the population pyramid (Naj), we do observe the overall Covid mortality rate, 
mj. If we assume a constant infection rate across ages in each country, 𝜙𝑗, then the 











8 Those aged 100 or more are counted as being 99. 
9 If those who die from Covid are systematically less healthy than those who don’t at any given age, then 
using the pre-pandemic residual life expectancy to estimate LY may introduce some upward bias. 




where 𝜇𝑎𝑗 is the age-specific infection fatality rate (IFR) in country j. Since IFRs are also 
not observed for each age group for many countries, we follow DFMS in imputing the 
infection fatality rate estimated for France by Salje et al. (2020) to all high-income 
countries in our sample, and the IFR estimated for China by Verity et al. (2020) to all other 
countries.10 Under those assumptions, we can solve Eq. (3) for each country’s infection 
rate 𝜙𝑗. The estimated age-specific Covid mortality rates for each country, ?̂?𝑎𝑗, are then 
given by: 
 
?̂?𝑎𝑗 = 𝜇𝑎𝑗𝜙𝑗 (4) 
 
Plugging ?̂?𝑎𝑗 into Equation (2) yields our estimates for the number of years of life lost to 
Covid in each country, 𝐿𝑌𝑗. We estimate that Covid-induced mortality in the year to 15 
December 2020 caused the loss of 19.3 million years of life across the 145 countries in 
our sample (which account for 96% of the world’s population). Absolute numbers range 
from 14 in Burundi to 3,148,000 in the United States.11  
 
Those aggregates obviously depend a great deal on the country’s population. Figure 1 
below plots 𝐿𝑌𝑗 adjusted by population (LY per 100,000 people) against each country’s 
GDP per capita, with both axes in logarithmic scale. Two features of the scatter plot are 
worth highlighting: First there is enormous variation in the population-adjusted loss of life-
years across countries. Even if one discounts Burundi and Tanzania as outliers where 
reporting is unlikely to have been reliable, LYs range from roughly one year lost per 
100,000 people (in countries as diverse as Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam) 
to one or more years lost per 100 people, in a large set of countries including Brazil, Peru, 
Mexico, Belgium, the Czech Republic and the United States. Some of that variation is 
systematic: Figure 1 reveals a strongly positive (and concave) relationship between the 
mortality costs of Covid and level of economic development.12 Second, however, there is 
 
10 Alternative approaches to addressing this missing data problem – that we do not observe Covid-19 
mortality disaggregated by age for most countries – are possible. Instead of assuming an age-invariant 
infection rate for each country and imputing China’s and France’s IFR to other countries, Heuveline and 
Tzen (2021) assume that the shape of the distribution of Covid-19 deaths by age (and gender) in other 
countries is similar to that of the United States. Their method and ours generate remarkably similar 
distributions of years of life lost across countries, with a correlation in logs of 0.99. Details of the comparison 
are available from the authors on request. 
11 Measurement error is likely to plague a number of these country estimates, with under-reporting being of 
particular concern. Deaton (2021) singles out Burundi and Tanzania as likely candidates for under-
reporting. 
12 Deaton (2021) presents a similar figure that plots the log of lives – rather than life-years – lost against 
log GDP per capita. He notes that “there is no relationship […] within the OECD.” Goldberg and Reed 
(2020) also document that, as of July 2020, the number of lives lost to Covid per million inhabitants was 
larger in advanced economies than in developing countries. They suggest that older populations and a 
greater prevalence of obesity in developed countries can partially explain this positive association between 
mortality and development. 




also considerable variation around the regression line at each income level – particularly 
at and above per capita GDP levels of $5,000 or thereabouts: Brazil and Thailand have 
comparable per capita income levels, but Brazil lost roughly one thousand life-years for 
each life-year lost in Thailand, controlling for population. The disparity is even greater 
between Bolivia and Vietnam, and still striking between France and South Korea. 
 
Figure 1.  Life-years lost to Covid, and GDP per capita 
  
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
What explains this massive variation in population-adjusted life-years lost to Covid – both 
across and within country-income categories? Mechanically, Equation (2) tells us that it 
must reflect cross-country differences in three variables: the age structure of the 
population (𝑁𝑎𝑗) residual life-expectancies at each age (𝜆𝑎𝑗), and age-specific mortality 
rates (𝑚𝑎𝑗). The first two are slow-moving variables that reflect each country’s historical 
development; the stage of the demographic transition they are in; access to and the 
quality of their health care systems, etc.  
 
The last variable – the country’s age-specific mortality rates, which are themselves the 
product of infection rates and infection fatality rates (Eq. 4) – reflects each country’s 
exposure and response to the pandemic. Infection rates, (which vary substantially 
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the extent to which health systems were able to prevent spread within the country. 
Infection rates are also likely to depend on urbanization and climate. Infection-fatality 
rates reflect the quality of health care and the extent to which, for example, hospitals were 
overwhelmed by the pandemic at any stage.  
 
Our data suggests that all three of these variables contribute to the positive association 
between the population-adjusted mortality burden of the pandemic and national per capita 
income seen in Figure 1. It is well-know that Covid mortality varies substantially with age, 
and that it is much higher for the elderly. Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the ratio of Covid 
mortality among those aged 65 and over to the mortality among 20-39 year-olds in our 
data: the ratio ranges from around 100 in low and middle-income countries to between 
200 and 300 among high-income countries.13 
 
Figures A2 and A3 plot indicators for the other two variables, namely the age structure of 
the population and age-specific residual life expectancies, both against per capita GDP. 
Specifically, Figure A2 plots the share of the population aged 65 or over (which ranges 
from 3-4% among the poorest countries to 20-25% among some of the richest); and 
Figure A3 looks at the residual life expectancy at age 65 across countries – which ranges 
from 13-15 years among most low-income countries (LICs) to 20-23 at the high-end, 
among high-income countries (HICs).  These upward sloping curves in Figures A1 – A3 
suggest that all three variables play some role in contributing to the positive slope in 
Figure 1. Covid mortality is highly selective on age; richer countries have many more 
people in the vulnerable, elderly age ranges; and they tend to have higher life-
expectancies at those ages, implying a larger number of years lost per death. 
 
Turning to the estimates of poverty years added by the Covid pandemic, it is important to 
note, first of all, that the household surveys from which we generally obtain reasonably 
reliable estimates of poverty are not yet available for 2020 in any country. This means 
that actual data on household incomes or consumption levels are not available at this 
time, and one must rely on ex-ante estimates and approximations.  
 
In that context, our basic approach is to compare “expected” poverty rates in 2020 under 
two scenarios: one with Covid and one without. To do this, we use three basic ingredients. 
The first is the remarkable collection of household survey microdata from 166 countries 
contained in the World Bank’s PovcalNet database.14 The dates of the latest household 
surveys in PovcalNet vary across countries, but all are “aligned” to 2019, using historically 
documented growth rates in GDP per capita and a pass-through coefficient to adjust for 
 
13 Some of actual variation in this ratio is missing because age-specific mortality data is, as discussed 
earlier, not widely available, so we use France’s IFR for all HICs, and China’s for all other countries. This 
accounts for the sharp jump between MICs and HICs in Figure A1. 
14 We use data from 145 of these 166 countries, for which we can find the required mortality statistics. 




the fact that growth in mean incomes in household surveys is typically less than GDP per 
capita growth measured in the National Accounts.15 This procedure, which is carried out 
internally at the World Bank for nowcasting poverty, assumes no change in inequality 
between the last available household survey and 2019.  
 
Our starting point are these distributions of household per capita income or consumption, 
expressed in US dollars at PPP exchange rates, aligned for the pre-Covid year of 2019. 
For any given poverty line z expressed in per capita terms, the share of the population 
with incomes below that line in country j is the headcount measure of poverty incidence, 
𝐻𝑗
2019(𝑧). We then obtain our estimate of poverty in the counterfactual “no-Covid 2020” 
scenario by inflating the 2019 income vector in country j by one plus the (adjusted) growth 
rate forecast for 2020 in the January 2020 issue of the Global Economics Prospect (GEP): 
𝐻𝑗
2020𝑁(𝑧). The poverty estimate for the 2020 Covid scenario, 𝐻𝑗
2020𝐶(𝑧), is similarly 
obtained by inflating the same 2019 income vector in country j by one plus the (adjusted) 
growth rate forecast for 2020 in the October 2020 Macro and Poverty Outlook report of 
the World Bank.16  
 
The idea, of course, is that the January forecasts were produced at a time when Covid-
19 was a little heard-of virus confined to Wuhan province in China, and no 
macroeconomist had remotely imagined a pandemic on the scale we have since seen. 
The October forecasts, on the other hand, were the latest available for 2020 at the time 
of writing and reflect the World Bank’s expectations of the pandemic’s impact on growth 
around the world. Finally, we assume – conservatively – that the short-run poverty effect 
of the pandemic lasts for a single year, so that each additional person in poverty 




As the formula indicates, the number of poverty-years added by the pandemic depends 
on the poverty line that is used. Figure 2 below presents two of many possible poverty 
line options: Panel A uses a constant absolute line for all countries, namely the World 
Bank’s international (extreme) poverty line of $1.90 per person per day (Ferreira et al. 
2016). While there are good reasons for using the same poverty line in an international 
comparison of this kind, there are equally valid arguments for attempting to account for 
 
15 It is assumed that 85 percent of growth in GDP per capita is passed through to growth in welfare observed 
in household surveys in line with historical evidence (Lakner et al., 2020) 
16 This method assumes that the adjusted growth rates in real GDP per capita accurately reflect the growth 
(or shrinkage) in household consumption. With ongoing globalization, the importance of tax havens, and so 
on, one might imagine that GDP has further decoupled from household consumption and that other 
variables from national accounts--or other economic indicators altogether--could be more informative. Yet 
Castaneda et al. (2019) show that, out of more than a thousand variables, the change in real GDP per 
capita is the second most predictive variable of changes in household consumption. The only variable that 
does better is changes in employment, for which we do not have pre- and post-COVID forecasts for 2020 
that are widely comparable across a large number of countries. 




the fact that basic needs themselves may vary with national income, and that a different 
(and costlier) bundle of commodities may be needed to achieve the same welfare (or 
capabilities) threshold in Austria, say, than in Afghanistan. This latter view implies that 
“poverty” means different things (at least in income terms) in countries where average 
incomes are vastly different, and often leads to the adoption of relative or weakly-relative 
poverty lines (see, e.g. Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2001, and Ravallion and Chen, 
2011).17  
 
Panel B of Figure 2 adopts a (coarse) step-function approximation to a relative poverty 
line. It uses the World Bank’s income-class poverty lines proposed by Jolliffe and Prydz 
(2016). Using a database of contemporaneous national poverty lines in 126 economies, 
these authors selected the median values of per capita poverty lines among low-income 
countries ($1.90); lower middle-income countries ($3.20); upper middle-income countries 
($5.50); and high-income countries ($21.70). In Panel B, poverty years are computed 
using these income-class specific poverty lines for countries in each income category.  
 
Using the $1.90 line for all countries, we estimate that a total of 121 million additional 
poverty years were induced by Covid-19 in the year to 15 December 2020 across the 145 
countries in our sample. Absolute numbers range from -35,800 in Papua New Guinea18 
to 74.2 million in India. Panel A in Figure 2 reveals – perhaps unsurprisingly - a strongly 
downward-sloping relationship with GDP per capita, with an average of 2,568 poverty 
years per 100,000 people added in low-income countries, as compared to 28.5 years per 
100,000 people added in high-income countries.  
 
The negative slope disappears completely in Panel B, where median poverty lines from 
each country income category (LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs) are used for countries in 
the respective groups. The linear regression line across the entire scatterplot has a slope 
of -0.0286 (p-value = 0.612). The mean number of PYs/100,000 people is 2,568 for LICs, 
2,778 for LMICs, 3,418 for UMICs and 3,330 for HICs. It is perhaps worth noting that there 
is nothing mechanical about this particular result: there is no reason why one would 
necessarily expect that adopting median poverty lines among groups of progressively 
richer countries would completely eliminate the negative association between the poverty 
burden of the pandemic and GDP per capita. Using these more generous poverty lines, 
our estimate for the total number of additional poverty years induced by the pandemic 




17 Note that this argument is unrelated to differences in prices, which are supposed to be addressed by the 
use of PPP exchange rates. 
18 Papua New Guinea is the only country for which the October 2020 growth forecast for 2020 was higher 
than the January 2020 forecast. 




Figure 2. Poverty-years added by Covid, and GDP per capita 






Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
 
The next Section seeks to combine the country-level PY and LY estimates obtained 
above in order to assess their relative and absolute importance in determining overall 
welfare losses from the pandemic. 
 
 
3. Total welfare losses and the relative contributions of death and 
destitution   
 
Given the estimates of life-years (LYs) lost and of additional poverty-years (PYs) due to 
the pandemic, we now ask: first, which of the two sources contributed the most to lowering 
welfare in each country; and second, what were those total welfare costs, using our metric 
of poverty years. The answers to both questions depend critically on the value of α, the 
normative parameter that tells us how many PYs cause as great a welfare loss as a single 
LY. Given a value of α and the ratio of PYs to LYs observed in any particular country, we 
can immediately tell whether poverty or mortality contributed the most to the aggregate 
welfare losses from the pandemic in that country. If we denote that empirical ratio by ?̂?𝑗 =
𝑃𝑌𝑗 𝐿𝑌𝑗⁄ , then an observer with 𝛼 > ?̂?𝑗 will regard mortality as the principal source of 
welfare loss in country j. Conversely, if 𝛼 < ?̂?𝑗, poverty is considered the greatest source 
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Figure 3 plots those observed ratios ?̂?𝑗 against GDP per capita for all countries in our 
sample, using the income-class specific poverty lines used in Panel B of Figure 2.  (The 
line is even steeper if the constant $1.90 line were used instead.) Two things are 
immediately apparent: first, the variation in empirical PY/LY ratios is enormous: the 
median ?̂?𝑗 is 15.7 (in United Arab Emirates) and the range is from 0.33 (in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) to 5537 (in Burundi).19 Second, the poverty to life-years ratio is strongly 
negatively correlated with GDP per capita: although the regression lines shown in Figure 
3 are for each income class, a simple linear regression over the entire sample has a slope 
of -1.043, (p-value = 0.000). 
 
Figure 3. PY/LY ratios and GDP per capita 
  
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
So far, we have been entirely agnostic about the value of α. Indeed, we argue that one 
advantage of our approach is that it can encapsulate the normatively challenging trade-
off between lives and livelihoods in a single, easily interpretable parameter, while 
simultaneously remaining agnostic about its value. In order to make further progress in 
interpreting Figure 3, however, it will prove helpful to suggest a “plausible range” for α, 
which we set at 5 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 20. In terms of the question we proposed earlier as a means to 
 
19 Looking only at positive values, and thus excluding Papua New Guinea (see previous footnote) and 
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elicit the normative judgement, this range means that most people in a country value an 
additional year of life-expectancy as being worth spending at least an additional five 
years, and at most an additional twenty years, in poverty.  
 
We do not yet have robust empirical evidence from surveys or experiments that try to 
elicit empirical values of α, so the reader may of course pick a value completely outside 
that range.20 But those who are comfortable with such a range could, on inspection of 
Figure 3, classify countries into three broad groups. Those below the band of grey shadow 
(?̂?𝑗 ≤ 5) are countries where the social welfare cost of the pandemic until December 2020 
arose primarily from additional mortality, rather than from increases in poverty. This group 
includes a wide variety of nations, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Russia, Belgium and the US. 
The most extreme cases are Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Belarus where ?̂?𝑗 is 
below the theoretical unity lower bound for α. Belgium and the Czech Republic are close 
behind. This first group consists primarily of upper-middle and high-income countries and 
does not include a single low-income country.  
 
A second group consists of those above the band of grey shadow in the Figure (?̂?𝑗 ≥ 20). 
In these countries, increased destitution contributed more to declining social welfare than 
deaths and the loss of life years they caused. There are 70 countries in this group, 
including most low- and lower middle-income countries. This group also includes most 
countries frequently identified in the popular media as successful in combating the 
pandemic, through early lockdowns strictly enforced and/or well-functioning testing and 
tracing systems, such as Australia, China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam. Uruguay is the 
only continental Latin American country in this group, while its neighbours Argentina and 
Brazil (as well as Chile) are in Group 1 above.21  
 
The third group consists of those countries in the grey band (5 ≤ ?̂?𝑗 ≤ 20), whose 
empirical PY/LY ratios fall within our “plausible range” for α. Given that range, we are 
unable or unwilling to select either poverty or mortality as the main culprit in lowering 
social welfare in these countries. In other words, these are countries where their relative 
contributions were broadly similar. The group includes countries from every income 
category, from Nepal at the poorer end to Norway and the United Arab Emirates at the 
richer end. But Nepal and Tajikistan are the only two low-income countries in the group; 
all other LICs are in Group 2, where poverty dominated mortality as a source of declining 
well-being from the pandemic. 
 
20 Preliminary results from surveys we have conducted in the US, UK and South Africa suggest very low 
values for α. The mean across the three samples was 2.6. Work on these surveys is ongoing, and these 
early results are tentative and should be treated with caution. Nonetheless, they suggest that, if anything, 
our plausible range for α is on the high side, which would lead the results that follow to place “too much” 
weight on mortality, relative to poverty. 
21 In the Caribbean, Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago are also in Group 2. 




Can we go beyond the relative contributions of mortality and poverty in each country and 
compute the aggregate welfare losses from the pandemic (arising from deaths and 
additional destitution) in each country? Strictly speaking, of course, we suffer from the 
usual problem of choosing a suitable unit for measuring well-being. Under our simple 
model, briefly described in the Introduction, the change in welfare in country j is given by 
(𝛼𝐿𝑌𝑗 + 𝑃𝑌𝑗)∆𝑢𝑝, where ∆𝑢𝑝 is expressed in utility terms. However, since we have 
assumed that the quantity ∆𝑢𝑝 is constant across individuals (and countries), we can do 
the next best thing and use the weighted sum of life-years and poverty-years (𝛼𝐿𝑌𝑗 + 𝑃𝑌𝑗) 
as our measure of social welfare loss, which corresponds to using additional years spent 
in poverty as our social welfare metric.  
 
Once again, this exercise does require choosing both an approach to poverty 
identification (one or more poverty lines) as well as one or a range of values for 𝛼. For 
consistency, we use the same two sets of poverty lines used in Figure 2 (a constant line 
of $1.90, and the set of four median lines for LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs). For 𝛼 we 
pick the bounds of our guidance range, namely 𝛼 = 5 and 𝛼 = 20. Figure 4 below plots 
aggregate social welfare losses, 𝛼𝐿𝑌𝑗 + 𝑃𝑌𝑗, against GDP per capita for all 145 countries 
in our sample: The first row (Panels A and B) uses the constant poverty line of $1.90: 
Panel A uses 𝛼 = 5 and Panel B uses 𝛼 = 20. The second line (Panels C and D) uses 
the income-classification poverty lines: once again with 𝛼 = 5 in Panel C and 𝛼 = 20 in 
Panel D. To control for population sizes, in all cases the welfare costs are expressed per 
100,000 people.  
 
As expected, there is a great deal of cross-country variation in the welfare burden of the 
pandemic, regardless of which panel one looks at. The unit of measurement along the y-
axis, as noted earlier, is additional person-years spent in poverty per 100,000 people. In 
panel A, using the most stringent global poverty line ($1.90 per person per day) and a 
relatively low value of 𝛼, the burden ranges from 26 in Thailand and 62 in China, to 7,556 
in Belgium and 9,811 in Peru. The regression line across the scatter of countries in Panel 
A is downward sloping and that negative slope (-0.14) is statistically significant (p=0.036), 
indicating a negative association between national income and the aggregate welfare 
losses from the deaths and destitution caused by the pandemic. Given the strong positive 
association between the mortality burden and GDP per capita seen in Figure 1, this is an 
important finding: the pandemic appears to have induced such large increases in extreme 
poverty in poor countries (Figure 2A) that the combined burden of poverty and mortality 
is, on average, greater for them than for richer countries.22 
 
22 Yet, there is so much variation around the regression line that, even with this parameter configuration, 
the greatest losses in welfare were recorded in upper middle-income countries such as Belize, Macedonia 
and Peru, alongside rich countries like Belgium. But poorer countries such as Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone 
and Zimbabwe are not far behind. 




The pattern changes (and the overall numbers are mechanically higher) in Panel B, where 
each life-year lost is counted as being equivalent to 20, rather than 5, added poverty-
years.  The association with GDP per capita now becomes positive and statistically 
significant, because mortality was much higher in richer countries. 
 
Figure 4. Total welfare losses from the pandemic, and GDP per capita 












Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
Panels C and D would be preferred by those who take a more relative view of poverty. 
They use poverty lines that are typical of countries in their income ranges: $1.90 for low-
income countries; $3.20 for lower middle-income countries; $5.50 for upper middle-
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of poverty years in all but the low-income countries, and the positive slope of the 
relationship with GDP per capita strengthens further, first with 𝛼 = 5, and even more with 
𝛼 = 20. Using more demanding poverty lines in upper middle-income countries means 
that ranks change at the bottom, with Tajikistan and Vietnam now reporting the lowest 
welfare burdens in the world, at 376 and 422 years per 100,000 people respectively (with 
𝛼 = 5). Fiji (15,855) and Peru (13,631) now occupy the top ranks in the distribution of 
population-adjusted welfare losses. 
 
Figure 4 tells us that whether total welfare losses (from deaths and short-term increases 
in poverty) are deemed to rise or fall with national income per capita depends on how one 
chooses to define and compare poverty across countries, and on the relative welfare 
weight between mortality and poverty. When one takes a more relative view of poverty, 
allowing for the fact that different (more expensive) bundles of goods are needed to 
escape poverty in richer countries, then the impact of the pandemic on poverty is 
uncorrelated with per capita income (Figure 2B). Since mortality is strongly correlated 
with income, this implies that overall losses are greater in richer than in poorer countries 
on average. This is still true even if a constant extreme poverty line is used, provided the 
welfare weight of mortality relative to poverty is high enough (Figure 4B).  
 
The positive association in Figures 4B, C and D is clearly related to Deaton’s (2021) 
finding that the effect of the pandemic on economic growth was negatively associated 
with GDP per capita – that is: on average, richer countries experienced larger proportional 
declines in real national income (as well as more deaths per capita).23 But, as the author 
was careful to point out, his “results say nothing about whether the degree of suffering 
has been larger of smaller in poor countries” (Deaton, 2021, p.4). Our results are also far 
from capturing all the suffering caused by the pandemic: as discussed earlier, disutility 
from ill health among survivors and losses from increased malnutrition or paused 
schooling are ignored, among other things. Nonetheless, if one takes falling into extreme 
poverty (relative to the $1.90 line) as an indication of absolute economic suffering, our 
results suggest that the positive association can be reversed – provided the weight placed 







23 The fact that economic contractions were deeper in countries where the loss of life was greater is also 
consistent with the finding by Andersen and Gonzalez (forthcoming) that reductions in economic mobility 
(using data from Google’s Community Mobility Reports) and the loss of life years were positively correlated 
across countries. 






In this paper we have sought to address two sets of questions: First, what were the 
relative contributions of increased mortality and poverty to the welfare losses caused by 
the pandemic, and did those contributions vary systematically across countries? Second, 
how large were the aggregate welfare losses, and how were they distributed across 
countries? We focused on welfare losses caused by extreme outcomes along both the 
health and income dimensions: death and destitution (defined as falling into poverty). 
Following our earlier work in DFMS, we have used years of human life (either lost to 
premature death or lived in poverty) as our unit of measurement.  
 
Measuring the mortality burden in terms of years of life lost, we found that this burden 
increases systematically and markedly with per capita GDP. There were approximately 
one hundred times as many years of life lost per capita among the high- and upper-middle 
income countries that lost the most, as in a typical low-income country. This massive 
disparity was driven by the fact that Covid-19 kills older people disproportionately, and 
considerably larger fractions of the population are elderly in richer than in poorer 
countries. Higher residual life-expectancies among the elderly in richer countries also 
contributed.  
 
The association between the poverty burden (measured in terms of additional years spent 
in poverty) and GDP per capita depends on how the poor are identified. Using a constant 
absolute poverty line such as the international (extreme) poverty line of $1.90, the poverty 
burden is strongly negatively associated with GDP per capita. The world’s poorest 
countries experienced poverty burdens between one hundred and one thousand times 
greater than the richest. However, when poverty lines typical of each of the four income 
categories (low income, lower middle-income, upper middle-income and high income) are 
used instead, that relationship effectively disappears.  
 
Either way, the relative contribution of poverty (vis-à-vis mortality) to the aggregate 
welfare burden is much higher in poorer countries. In fact, the ratio declines systematically 
with GDP per capita across the whole range. This leads to an important first conclusion: 
the economic consequences of the pandemic in terms of increased poverty cannot be 
treated as being of secondary importance. Even at our most conservative rate for 
comparing life- and poverty-years (twenty of the latter to one of the former), there are 70 
countries in our sample where poverty was a more important source of declining well-
being than mortality. That number rises to 108 countries (three quarters of our sample) at 
the lower rate of five poverty-years to one life-year. Most (but not all) of those countries 
tend to be poor. They are not the countries where the medical and social scientists, 
journalists and global civil servants that set the terms of the “global” public debate are 




located. The importance of the poverty consequences of the pandemic, relative to those 
of mortality, has not been given its proper weight in the global discussion.  
 
Our second main conclusion relates to the distribution of the aggregate welfare burden 
across countries – and it is nuanced. We show that the association between the welfare 
burden and initial per capita incomes is not always, unambiguously either positive or 
negative. Instead, the shape of the relationship depends on two key factors: how poverty 
is defined, and the welfare weight placed on it relative to mortality. When poverty in a 
country is assessed in terms of poverty lines typical of countries at similar levels of 
development, a positive association arises: richer countries have suffered a greater loss 
in welfare than poor ones in this pandemic. That conclusion still holds even if the 
international extreme poverty line (IPL) is used instead, provided sufficient weight is 
placed on mortality relative to poverty. But if the IPL is combined with a lower welfare 
weight for death relative to destitution, the association reverses and poorer countries bear 
a greater welfare loss from the pandemic on average. 
 
The fact that the association can be positive under plausible parameter configurations at 
all reflects once again the magnitude of the income gradient of Covid-mortality, one 
version of which is our Figure 1. Although this gradient does reflect population age 
structures, including residual life-expectancies, it is important to note that demography is 
not destiny. Japan, by some measures the world’s “oldest” country, suffered welfare 
losses orders of magnitude lower than Belgium, Germany and the US. China, South 
Korea, Norway and Australia did even better. This is probably one of those cases where 
the variation around the regression line matters more than the variation along it. That is 
the variation that reflects, among other things, differences in policy responses: the speed 
with which the virus was contained upon arrival, either by effective testing and tracing 
protocols or by early and well-enforced lockdowns, by early and widespread use of masks 
and social distancing, or some combination of the above. Our study has nothing to say 
about that fundamental source of variation. 
 
Four final caveats are warranted. First, and as noted earlier, our results are sensitive to 
measurement error. The possibility that Covid-related mortality is substantially under-
estimated in many countries is of particular concern. If the underestimation is 
concentrated among poor countries, this could alter both of our main findings. Second – 
and also noted earlier – we have used “aggregate” or “total” welfare loss as a shorthand 
for losses arising from mortality and entry into poverty. The pandemic has undoubtedly 
had other effects on well-being, both current and future; both among the sick and among 
those only indirectly affected. 
 




Third, the pandemic is still ongoing, and the distribution of both the poverty and mortality 
burdens in 2021 may turn out to be very different from that of 2020 – particularly as access 
to vaccination is spreading unequally around the world. This could cause an eventual 
“post-pandemic” version of the global distribution of welfare losses to differ from all of 
those in our Figure 4, with poorer countries doing even worse.  
 
Fourth, we have nothing to say on the important issue of how losses in well-being are 
distributed within countries. If, as seems likely, richer countries have been better able to 
cushion the losses among their poorer residents than poor countries have, it is quite 
possible that the world’s very poorest people have suffered the most. An investigation of 
the distributional consequences within countries will be extremely important, but it will 
require post-pandemic household survey data and goes beyond the remit of this paper. 
Despite these important caveats, our analysis does suggest that the poverty 
consequences of the pandemic should be given as much importance in the global policy 
conversation as its (horrendous) mortality consequences. For most poor and middle-
income countries, greater economic deprivation has in fact been a more important source 
of loss in well-being than premature mortality. Ignoring the large welfare costs of 
destitution would lead us to wrong conclusions about the distribution of the burden of the 
pandemic across countries, exaggerating the share of suffering visited on richer, older 
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Age-specific mortality estimates; share of the population over 65; and residual life-expectancies 
at 65 all correlate with GDP per capita 
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Figure A2. Share of the population aged 65+ and national per capita income 
  
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
Figure A3. Residual life expectancy at 65 and national per capita income 
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